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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

PEDALING TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE TAX-RIDE FOR
CYCLISTS

INTRODUCTION
With the beginning of each new decade comes a time for reflection on the
past and speculation about the future. As we look back over the last ten years,
wrought with turbulence and conflict, it is tempting to feel angst about what
will come. Our country—its heart and stability—was challenged in an
unparalleled way. From feelings of despair and anger after 9/11 and
helplessness after the stock market collapsed, to feelings of frustration caused
by the heated debate over climate change and the global energy crisis, as a
nation, we were forced to redefine who we are and what values we hold dear.
In time, we emerged from the rubble of the Twin Towers and rallied around
our troops, vowed to hold our peers accountable and rebuild Wall Street, and
joined together to develop alternative energy sources. Bred from that passion
and loyalty we committed not only to dealing with the present, but also to
preparing for the future—our country’s future. So instead of merely looking to
the future with angst, we may also look with optimism because, above all, we
remain united.
One of the most comprehensive examples of our collective efforts to
rebuild the nation is the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (the
Bailout Bill), which President George W. Bush signed into law on October 3,
2008.1 The purpose of the Bailout Bill was to provide stability to the economy
through federal acquisition of assets and to promote energy production and tax
relief through amendments to the Internal Revenue Code (the Tax Code).2 One
of the Bailout Bill’s amendments to the Tax Code extended a tax incentive to
employees who elect to ride a bicycle to work.3 Section 211 made certain

1. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
2. Id. The Act’s stated purpose was:
To provide authority for the Federal Government to purchase and insure certain types of
troubled assets for the purposes of providing stability to and preventing disruption in the
economy and financial system and protecting taxpayers, to amend the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 to provide incentives for energy production and conservation, to extend
certain expiring provisions, to provide individual income tax relief, and for other
purposes.
Id.
3. Id. § 211, 122 Stat. at 3840–41.
423
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reimbursements from employers to employees for expenses incurred
commuting from home to work by bicycle nontaxable.4 Reimbursements by
employers to employees for the purchase, maintenance, and storage bicycles
were all included.5 No such benefit was provided to employees prior to the
Bailout Bill; thus, the amendment was met with relief and optimism by bicycle
advocates who had been attempting to implement such a provision for years.6
Andy Thornley, the program director for the San Francisco Bicycle Coalition,
stated that this amendment “significantly legitimize[d] bicycling and elevate[d]
it to a credible commute mode, like riding a bus or train.”7
Despite the initial excitement, some cyclists have expressed concern that
the maximum nontaxable reimbursement will not cover their actual bicyclerelated commuting expenses.8 Such concern is well founded. The National
Bicycle Dealers Association reported that the average price for bicycles sold in
2009 was $500;9 however, the maximum excludable nontaxable
reimbursement is $20/month (or $240/year).10 Another concern with the
current provision is that employees are not permitted to concurrently receive
nontaxable reimbursements for bicycle commuting expenses and nontaxable
Specifically,
reimbursements for other similar commuting expenses.11
employees are prohibited from receiving nontaxable reimbursements for
commuting by bicycle and nontaxable reimbursements for using mass transit
(such as bus or light-rail systems) or nontaxable reimbursements for
commuting by bicycle and nontaxable reimbursements for carpooling.12 For
example, if Phil rode his bike to the subway and then took the subway to work,
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Rachel Gordon, Bailout Gives Cyclists a Leg Up; As of January, Bike Commuters Can
Get $20-a-month, Tax-free Reimbursement, S.F. CHRON., Oct. 9, 2008, at B1.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Industry Overview 2009, NAT’L BICYCLE DEALERS ASS’N, http://nbda.com/articles/
industry-overview-2009-pg34.htm (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
10. I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(F)(ii) (Supp. II 2009) (“The term ‘applicable annual limitation’ means,
with respect to any employee for any calendar year, the product of $20 multiplied by the number
of qualified bicycle commuting months during such year.”).
11. Id. § 132(f)(2).
The amount of the fringe benefits which are provided by an employer to any employee
and which may be excluded from gross income under subsection (a)(5) shall not exceed—
(A) $100 per month in the case of the aggregate of [transportation in a commuter highway
vehicle and any transit pass], (B) $175 per month in the case of qualified parking, and (C)
the applicable limitation in the case of any qualified bicycle commuting reimbursement.
Id. (emphasis added).
12. Id. § 132(f)(5)(F)(iii)(II) (stating that bicycle reimbursements may only be excluded
when no other qualified transportation benefit is received by the employee). See infra text
accompanying notes 69–70 (explaining the definitions of “commuter highway vehicles” and
“mass transit” benefits).
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Phil could not receive nontaxable reimbursements from his employer for the
costs he incurred for the bicycle and the subway ticket. Similarly, if Phil rode
his bike in good weather and carpooled in bad weather, Phil could not receive
nontaxable reimbursements from his employer for the costs incurred for the
bicycle and for carpooling expenses.
In response to these concerns, on July 21, 2009, Representative Edward
Blumenauer proposed House Resolution 3271 (the Green Routes to Work Act),
which would expand the current benefits available to employees commuting by
bicycle.13 Under the proposed Green Routes to Work Act, employees would
be permitted to exclude bicycle commuting reimbursements and mass transit
benefits.14 Using the example from above, if Phil rode his bike to the subway
and then took the subway to work, Phil could receive nontaxable
reimbursements from his employer for the costs incurred for the bicycle and
for his subway ticket.
However, the proposed Green Routes to Work Act is not without flaws.
Notably, the proposed Green Routes to Work Act would not increase the
maximum amount of nontaxable reimbursements for bicycle commuting
expenses an employee can receive. Nor would the proposed bill allow
employees to receive nontaxable reimbursements for bicycle commuting
expenses and carpooling expenses.15 So under the proposed Green Routes to
Work Act, Phil could receive nontaxable reimbursements for riding his bike to
the subway and taking the subway to work but not for riding his bike to a
friend’s house and then carpooling to work.
Although the income tax system exists foremost to produce revenue for the
federal government, it also is used to promote social and economic goals.16 By
electing to tax some activities and not others, Congress creates monetary
incentives and disincentives that encourage or discourage taxpayers to engage
in those activities.17 Thus, Congress makes “fundamental social and economic
13. Green Routes to Work Act, H.R. Res. 3271, 111th Cong. (2009).
14. Id. § 9(a) (“Subclause (II) of section 132(f)(5)(F)(iii) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986 (defining qualified bicycling month) is amended by striking ‘, (B),’.”).
15. See id. § 9(a)–(d). See also id. § 2(a) (“Paragraph (2) of section 132(f) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 (relating to limitation on exclusion) is amended—(1) by striking ‘$100’ in
subparagraph (A) and inserting ‘$230’, and (2) by striking ‘$175’ in subparagraph (B) and
inserting ‘$230’.”); I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(F)(ii) (“The term ‘applicable annual limitation’ means,
with respect to any employee for any calendar year, the product of $20 multiplied by the number
of qualified bicycle commuting months during such year.”).
16. Roberta F. Mann, On the Road Again: How Tax Policy Drives Transportation Choice,
24 VA. TAX REV. 587, 620 (2005). See also Maureen B. Cavanaugh, On the Road to
Incoherence: Congress, Economics, and Taxes, 49 UCLA L. REV. 685, 687 (2002) (explaining
taxes may be seen as a means of generating revenue or achieving policy goals).
17. Tsilly Dagan, Commuting, 26 VA. TAX REV. 185, 187 (2006). See also Cavanaugh,
supra note 16, at 687 (“[G]overnments generally (and Congress in particular), have frequently
used both tax incentives and disincentives in an effort to address important social problems.”).
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judgments” when deciding which activities should be taxed.18 Which activities
are encouraged and discouraged within our tax code reveals “a certain vision
of the self and the way in which that self is situated in various contexts” which
reflects the way we perceive “our families, communities, and workplaces.”19
As a result, the changes the Bailout Bill made to the Tax Code and the
proposed changes within the Green Routes to Work Act are important not only
from a political perspective looking at how such legislation will affect tax law
and our economy directly, but they are also important from a sociological
perspective because “our income tax rules reflect and shape the society in
which we live and the nature of the communities we prefer.”20
One of the fundamental purposes of the Bailout Bill was to provide
incentives for energy conservation.21 This purpose was arguably an attempt to
mitigate the global energy crisis, but at the very least embodies the “green”
trend. “[G]reen is everywhere these days—in the news, politics, fashion, and
even technology.”22 By making certain reimbursements from employers to
employees for expenses incurred commuting from home to work by bicycle
nontaxable, Congress created a financial incentive to encourage employees to
ride their bicycles to work which, in a sense, reflects our society’s “green”
trends.
Nonetheless, historically Congress has been criticized for attempting to
advance social policy through the tax system.23 These critics argue that using
the tax system to promote social goals distorts the marketplace and
disproportionately benefits taxpayers with higher incomes.24 Both the
amendments to the Tax Code within the Bailout Bill and the proposed
amendments contained in the Green Routes to Work Act are vulnerable to such
attacks. However, I argue that incentivizing bicycle transportation through the
Tax Code is not subject to the same criticisms as are other policy initiatives
and, in fact, should be aggressively expanded and afforded more equitable tax

18. MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION:
PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1 (6th ed. 2009).
19. Dagan, supra note 17, at 188.
20. Id.
21. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765
(2008) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.); see also supra note 2.
22. How to Go Green: Why to Go Green, PLANETGREEN.COM, http://planetgreen.
discovery.com/go-green/ultimate-go-green/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
23. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 712–13.
24. Id. See also Stanley S. Surrey, Tax Incentives as a Device for Implementing Government
Policy: A Comparison with Direct Government Expenditures, 83 HARV. L. REV. 705, 719–25
(1970) (arguing tax incentives provide windfalls for activities taxpayers would engage in anyway,
are inequitable because they disproportionally benefit higher taxpayers, and distort the
marketplace).
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treatment in comparison to other similar nontaxable transportation benefits
within the Tax Code.
Part I describes the tax treatment of bicycle commuting expenses within
the Tax Code and draws distinctions between this and other similar benefit
categories. By reflecting on relevant legislation and interpretation of the Tax
Code by the courts, Part II chronicles the thirty-year progression that has
resulted in the present inequitable tax treatment for bicycle reimbursements.
This explanation serves as the foundation for my argument that these benefits
should be expanded and equalized with similar nontaxable benefits within the
Tax Code. Finally, Part III addresses many of the common arguments against
using the Tax Code as a means to advance social policy initiatives. In this
Section, by highlighting sociological empirical data, I attempt to reconcile
concerns about tax expenditures in general, with bicycle tax incentives
specifically, and concurrently advocate their expansion within the Tax Code.
I. WHAT ARE NONTAXABLE BICYCLE COMMUTING REIMBURSEMENTS?
In general, unless the Tax Code provides an exception, an individual must
pay taxes on everything they receive of monetary value, whether it is cash,
services, or goods.25 So generally, whenever an employee receives money
from an employer, the employee must pay taxes on that money because it
constitutes “gross income” under the Tax Code. The Tax Code defines “gross
income” as the taxable income a taxpayer accrues over the course of the year
from “whatever source derived.”26 For example, wages, commissions,
dividends, alimony payments, and lottery winnings all constitute taxable
income.27 The aggregate of such receipts forms the taxpayer’s “gross
income.”28
The Bailout Bill provided an exception to the general rule for
reimbursements from employers to employees for bicycle commuting
expenses.29 Now, when an employer reimburses their employee for certain
bicycle expenses, the employee does not have to pay taxes on that money. At
the macro level, the exception for bicycle transportation reimbursements is a
tax expenditure. At the micro level, the exception is defined as a qualified
transportation fringe benefit. An explanation of bicycle transportation
reimbursements as a tax expenditure and a qualified transportation fringe

25. I.R.C. § 61(a) (2006).
26. Id. (“Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income from
whatever source derived.”).
27. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 23. See also I.R.C. § 61(a)(1) (explaining some of
the receipts of income that are included in the calculation of an employees gross income).
28. I.R.C. § 61(a).
29. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 211, 122
Stat. 3765, 3840–41 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 132(f)).
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benefit is essential to understanding why the current treatment of bicycle
reimbursements is inequitable and forms the foundation for why I argue for
their expansion throughout this Comment.
A.

Tax Expenditures

The Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation defines “tax
expenditures” as “revenue losses attributable to provisions of the Federal tax
laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or deduction from gross
income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a deferral
of tax liability.”30 In other words, tax expenditures are reductions in tax
liability from special provisions or regulations that provide benefits to
taxpayers.31
Because of their classification as nontaxable income, thereby receiving
them from their general duty to pay tax on such income, bicycle
reimbursements can be categorized as a tax expenditure. However, nontaxable
income in the form of an exclusion32 is only one type of tax expenditure.
Deductions and credits are also forms of tax expenditures that constitute
exceptions to the general rule that any income generated is taxable income.33
Although exclusions, deductions, and credits are all tax expenditures that play
a role in the calculation of a taxpayer’s total annual tax liability, they are very
different from each other.34

30. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2008–2012 (J. Comm. Print 2008) [hereinafter 2008–2012
ESTIMATES]. The Joint Committee on Taxation prepares estimates of Federal Tax Expenditures
for the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance. Id. at 1.
See also Congressional Budget and Employment Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3, 88 Stat.
937, 938 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 1302) (defining a tax expenditure as “revenue losses
attributable to provisions of the Federal tax laws which allow a special exclusion, exemption, or
deduction from gross income or which provide a special credit, a preferential rate of tax, or a
deferral of tax liability.”).
31. STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 109TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2007–2011 (J. Comm. Print 2008), reprinted in GRAETZ &
SCHENK, supra note 18, at 41. The Joint Committee on Taxation was established in 1926 and is
comprised of members from both houses. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 68. The Joint
Committee on Taxation meets about three times per year and is intended to provide assistance to
the House Ways and Means Committee and the Senate Finance Committee. Id. The Joint
Committee on Taxation “is responsible for estimating the revenue effects of legislative proposals
and enacted legislation for the Congress.” Id.
32. See infra Part I.A.3.
33. 2008–2012 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 3.
34. See generally I.R.C. Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter B (discussing the computation of
taxable income).
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Deductions

Tax deductions are beneficial to the taxpayer because they constitute sums
of money that may be subtracted (i.e., deducted) from their gross income or
adjusted gross income when calculating the total sum that will determine the
taxpayer’s annual liability.35 There are many rules and restrictions governing
deductions that limit which expenses paid out by a taxpayer during a year may
be subtracted from the calculation of their annual gross income.36
Deductions are only beneficial up to the total amount of an individual’s
taxable income.37 For example, if a taxpayer has a gross income of $100 and
$150 worth of eligible deductions, after the deductions are subtracted from the
taxpayer’s gross income, the taxpayer’s adjusted gross income38 would be $0,
which means the taxpayer cannot take advantage of the remaining $50 of
deductions. Essentially, the eligible deductions that exceed the taxpayer’s
gross income are worthless.
In addition, categorizing an expense as a deduction does not automatically
benefit all taxpayers. While some deductions are automatically deductible
from an employee’s gross income,39 others, called “itemized deductions,” are
only subtracted from an employee’s gross income if they are greater than the
taxpayer’s standard deduction.40 Thus, a deduction does not always lower a
taxpayer’s taxable income, so it does not necessarily benefit the taxpayer.
2.

Credits

In contrast, a tax credit is applied against a taxpayer’s tax liability as
determined based on their adjusted gross income.41 Some tax credits are
refundable and others are not.42 Refundable credits benefit all taxpayers
regardless of their taxable income.43 If a taxpayer’s tax liability is less than the
applicable refundable credits, then the taxpayer will receive a check (i.e., cash)

35. I.R.C. § 62(a) (2006). See also GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 228 (explaining
deductions in general).
36. I.R.C. § 62(a). See also GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 228.
37. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 229.
38. I.R.C. § 62.
39. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 228.
40. I.R.C. § 63(c); see 2008–2012 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 37. See also GRAETZ &
SCHENK, supra note 18, at 24 (explaining the difference between itemized and standard
deductions). “The standard deduction is a flat amount specified by the Code that varies with
marital status, which the taxpayer may deduct regardless of actual expenses.” Id.
41. See I.R.C. §§ 21–54AA (listing available tax credits).
42. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 229. Compare I.R.C. § 21 (describing the
nonrefundable credit for “[e]xpenses for household and dependent care services necessary for
gainful employment”), with I.R.C. § 32 (describing the refundable credit for “[e]arned income”).
43. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 229. See also I.R.C. §§ 32–54AA (codifying tax
credits).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

430

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:423

for the difference.44 On the other hand, nonrefundable credits are only
beneficial up to the amount of a taxpayer’s tax liability.45 A taxpayer does not
receive a refund when his nonrefundable credit(s) are larger than his tax
liability.46 Thus, the maximum benefit a taxpayer will receive from a
nonrefundable credit will be a total tax liability of $0.
3.

Exclusions

Finally, exclusions like the one for bicycle transportation reimbursements,
are different than both refunds and credits because they are taken into
consideration when determining a taxpayer’s initial gross income.47 When an
item is defined as an exclusion, the amount of the item’s worth is not
considered income for purposes of calculating a taxpayer’s gross income.48
Because of the limits described above on deductions, taxpayers generally
prefer exclusions over deductions.49
As stated earlier, the Bailout Bill provided an exception to the general rule
that all income is taxable. Specifically, the Bailout Bill amended the Tax Code
so that some reimbursements from employers to employees for bicycle
commuting expenses would not constitute taxable income.50 In other words,
the income would be excluded from the calculation of the employee’s gross
income. Without the Bailout Bill provision, if an employer reimbursed
employees for bicycle expenses, the employees would have to pay tax on that
reimbursement.
B.

Qualified Transportation Fringe Benefits

In addition to being defined as an exclusion under the Tax Code,
nontaxable bicycle commuting reimbursements and other similar commuting
reimbursements are also defined as qualified transportation fringe benefits.51
All qualified transportation fringe benefits are also considered “tax

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 229.
Id. See also I.R.C. §§ 21–26 (codifying nonrefundable personal tax credits).
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 229.
See generally I.R.C. §§ 101–803 (codifying exclusions from gross income).
STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX
EXPENDITURES 93 (1973) (“The device of exclusion from gross income—the amount involved
simply need not be counted as income of the taxpayer in the computation of his gross income—is
used for all of the tax expenditure items benefiting the individual as wage or salary earner.”)
(emphasis in original).
49. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 228. There are very technical rules defining
which deductions are allowable and in what circumstances. See id. Such differences will not be
addressed in this paper.
50. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 211, 122
Stat. 3765, 3840–41 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 132(f)).
51. I.R.C. § 132(f)(1) (Supp. II 2009).
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expenditures.”52 But in order to fully understand the interplay between bicycle
commuting reimbursements and other similar (and more favorably treated)
commuting benefits, a more thorough analysis of the definition of qualified
transportation fringe benefits is required.
1.

Fringe Benefits Generally

The Oxford English Dictionary defines “fringe benefit” as “a perquisite or
benefit of some kind provided by an employer to supplement a money wage or
salary.”53 Other common examples of fringe benefits to employees include
employee discounts for products or services and retirement plans.54
Most fringe benefits constitute receipts of taxable income because, in
general, fringe benefits from employers constitute gross income and are,
therefore, taxable as part of an employee’s gross income.55 Congress carved
out the following exceptions to the general rule (including qualified
transportation fringe benefits) that employees may exclude from their gross
income: 1) no-additional-cost services;56 2) qualified employee discounts;57 3)
working condition fringe;58 4) de minimis fringe;59 5) qualified transportation
fringe;60 6) qualified moving expense reimbursements;61 7) qualified
retirement planning services;62 and 8) qualified military base realignment and
closure fringe.63 Bicycle commuting reimbursements, in addition to commuter
highway vehicle, transit pass, and parking nontaxable benefits, are defined as
qualified transportation fringe benefits.64

52. See I.R.C. § 132(a) (2006) (explaining which fringe benefits are excluded from gross
income); 2008–2012 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 38.
53. Wayne M. Gazur, Assessing Internal Revenue Code Section 132 After Twenty Years, 25
VA. TAX REV. 977, 980–81 (2006) (quoting THE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 200 (2d ed.
1989)).
54. I.R.C. § 132(c), (m) (2006).
55. Id. § 61(a)(1); 2008–2012 ESTIMATES , supra note 30, at 15.
56. I.R.C. § 132(a)(1).
57. Id. § 132(a)(2).
58. Id. § 132(a)(3).
59. Id. § 132(a)(4).
60. Id. § 132(a)(5).
61. I.R.C. § 132(a)(6).
62. Id. § 132(a)(7).
63. Id. § 132(a)(8).
64. I.R.C. § 132(f)(1)(D) (Supp. II 2009).
For purposes of this section, the term “qualified transportation fringe” means any of the
following provided by an employer to an employee: (A) Transportation in a commuter
highway vehicle if such transportation is in connection with travel between the
employee’s residence and place of employment. (B) Any transit pass. (C) Qualified
parking. (D) Any qualified bicycle commuting reimbursement.
Id. § 132(f)(1)(A)–(D).
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Qualified Transportation Fringe Benefits Specifically

Prior to the Bailout Bill,65 which added the bicycle commuting
reimbursement, there were only three types of qualified transportation fringe
benefits: 1) transportation in commuter highway vehicles (carpooling);66 2)
transit passes;67 and 3) qualified parking.68 First, commuter highway vehicles
seat at least six adults (not including the driver) and are used primarily for
carpooling employees between their residence and place of employment.69
Second, transit passes consist of “any pass, token, farecard, voucher, or similar
item” for transportation on mass transit facilities.70 Third, qualified parking
must be located on or near either the business premises or the location where
the employee connects with mass transit or carpool.71 Finally, bicycle
commuting reimbursements constitute any employer reimbursement to the
employee for “the purchase of a bicycle and bicycle improvements, repair, and
storage, if such bicycle is regularly used for travel between the employee’s
residence and place of employment.”72
3.

The Bicycle Commuting Reimbursement

Despite their recent addition to the category of excludable qualified
transportation fringe benefits, the limitations on eligible bicycle commuting
reimbursements are much stricter than those for other types of qualified
transportation fringe benefits.
Under the current statute, employees are very limited by the types of
transportation benefits that may be concurrently excluded and the maximum
exclusions for each. Only commuter highway vehicle and transit pass benefits
may be combined and excluded.73 Thus, employees may exclude: commuter
highway vehicle and transit pass benefits or parking benefits or bicycle

65. See supra notes 1–5 and accompanying text (discussing the Bailout Bill).
66. I.R.C. § 132(f)(1)(A) (2006).
67. Id. § 132(f)(1)(B).
68. Id. § 132(f)(1)(C).
69. Id. § 132(f)(5)(B). At least 80% of the vehicle’s mileage must be acquired “for purposes
of transporting employees in connection with travel between their residences and their place of
employment, and on trips during which the number of employees transported for such purposes is
at least ½ of the adult seating capacity of such vehicle (not including the driver).” Id. §
132(f)(5)(B)(ii).
70. Id. § 132(f)(5)(A). Such mass transportation facilities may be either private or publicly
owned. Id. § 132(f)(5)(A)(i).
71. I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(C).
72. I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(F)(i) (Supp. II 2009).
73. I.R.C. §§ 132(f)(1), 132 (f)(2)(A) (2006).
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reimbursements.74
In addition, within the categories of excludable
transportation reimbursements, there is a great disparity between the categories
based on their maximum exclusions.75 As articulated in Section 132(f) of the
Tax Code, employees may exclude up to $2,100/year ($175/month) in parking
benefits76 or $1,200/year ($100/month) in commuter highway vehicle and
transit pass benefits,77 whereas employees are only permitted to exclude
$240/year ($20/month) in bicycle reimbursement benefits.78
Although the American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009
temporarily increased and equalized the maximum excludable transportation
fringe benefit for parking and the combination of commuter highway vehicle
and transit passes to $2,760/year, bicycle reimbursements were casually
ignored.79
When juxtaposed against the other choices for eligible exclusions,
employees are likely to be discouraged from choosing to exclude bicycle
transportation reimbursements instead of parking or transit pass or commuter
highway vehicle benefits. Why would a taxpayer turn down a more convenient
parking benefit worth $2,100/year or a transit benefit worth $1,200/year, for a
bicycle benefit worth $240/year? I argue that employees should be able to
concurrently exclude commuter highway vehicle and transit pass and bicycle
reimbursements, and at a minimum, the aggregate exclusion should be equal to
the maximum exclusion for parking benefits.

74. See I.R.C. § 132(f)(2) (Supp. II 2009) (describing the three categories of exclusions); id.
§ 132(f)(5)(F)(iii)(II) (stating bicycle reimbursements may only be excluded when no other
transportation benefit is received by the employee).
75. Compare I.R.C. § 132(f)(2)(A) (2006) (describing the maximum exclusion for commuter
highway vehicle and transit pass benefits) and id. § 132(f)(2)(B) (describing the maximum
exclusion for parking benefits), with I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(F)(ii) (Supp. II 2009) (describing the
maximum exclusion for bicycle reimbursements).
76. I.R.C. § 132(f)(2)(B) (Supp. II 2009) (“The amount of the fringe benefits which are
provided by an employer to any employee and which may be excluded from gross income under
subsection (a)(5) shall not exceed . . . $175 per month in the case of qualified parking.”).
77. I.R.C. § 132(f)(2)(A) (2006).
The amount of the fringe benefits which are provided by an employer to any employee
and which may be excluded from gross income under subsection (a)(5) shall not exceed
$100 per month in the case of the aggregate of the benefits described in subparagraphs
(A) and (B) of paragraph (1).
Subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1) describe transportation in a commuter highway
vehicle and transit passes, respectively. Id. § 132(f)(1)(A)–(B).
78. I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(F)(ii) (Supp. II 2009) (“The term ‘applicable annual limitation’ means,
with respect to any employee for any calendar year, the product of $20 multiplied by the number
of qualified bicycle commuting months during such year.”).
79. American Recovery and Reinvestment Tax Act of 2009, Pub L. No. 111-5, § 1151(a),
123 Stat. 115, 333 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 132).
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II. HISTORICAL TREATMENT OF COMMUTING EXPENSES
As stated in the introduction, the Tax Code has been a means of raising
revenue for the federal government and a means of encouraging certain social
policy objectives.80 A brief summary of how the courts, legislators, and the
Internal Revenue Service have historically defined employee commuting
expenses is necessary to understand why I argue that the bicycle
reimbursement should receive favorable tax treatment and the exclusion should
be expanded.
A.

Commuting Expenses Generally Not Deductible

Historically, expenses incurred by an individual as a result of traveling
from his home to work have been considered a personal expense that is not
deductible81 from an employee’s gross income.82 The basis of this policy is
that commuting expenses should not be considered deductible business
expenses because “an employee does not incur such expenses in the direct
pursuit of his employer’s trade or business.”83 Rather, commuting expenses
should be codified as “personal, living, or family expenses”84 because they
reflect a taxpayer’s individual choice of where to live in relation to where they
work.85
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Flowers, the Supreme Court
upheld the lower Tax Court’s finding that expenses incurred when traveling
from home to work constituted living and personal expenses, as opposed to
traveling expenses in pursuit of trade or business; therefore, such expenses
were not deductible from an employee’s gross income.86 The Court explained
that an employee’s business-travel expenses are distinct from an employee’s
80. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 687.
81. Emphasizing deductible as opposed to excludable.
82. I.R.C. § 262(a) (2006); Wendy Gerzog Shaller, Limit Deductions for Mixed
Personal/Business Expenses: Curb Current Abuses and Restore Some Progressivity Into the Tax
Code, 41 CATH. U. L. REV. 581, 591 (1992).
83. I.R.C. § 162(a) (defining ordinary business expenses); William P. Kratzke, The
(Im)balance of Externalities in Employment-Based Exclusions from Gross Income, 60 TAX LAW.
1, 46 (2006) (citing Comm’r v. Flowers, 326 U.S. 465, 473 (1946)).
84. I.R.C. § 262(a); see also United States v. Tauferner, 407 F.2d 243, 246 (10th Cir. 1969)
(“Such travels are expenses within section 262 as ‘personal, living or family expenses’ whether in
an urban, suburban, or rural setting. They are not ordinary business expenses under section
162(a).”).
85. Dagan, supra note 17, at 202; Kratzke, supra note 83, at 46.
86. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 471–72. Section 23(a)(1)(A) is now codified in Section 162
pertaining to trade or business expenses. See I.R.C. § 162. See also Sullivan v. Comm’r, 1
B.T.A. 93, 93 (1924) (“The cost of transportation paid by an individual living at a distance from
his place of business, in going to and returning from such place of business, is not deductible as a
business expense. The operating cost, including depreciation, of an automobile so used by an
individual is not deductible as a business expense.”).
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daily transportation expenses because “[t]he exigencies of business rather than
the personal conveniences and necessities of the traveler must be the
motivating factors” for the travel.87 In other words, an employee’s expenses
for having to travel from their home office located in St. Louis, Missouri to
New York, New York for a convention are different than an employee’s daily
commuting expenses from their home in St. Charles, Missouri to their office
located in downtown St. Louis, Missouri.
Both the Internal Revenue Service and the courts have strictly interpreted
the Tax Code in their recognition of travel expenses as inherently personal.88
For example, neither a taxpayer’s special circumstances due to physical
impairments necessitating alternative transportation arrangements like a
taxicab89 or a specially designed automobile,90 nor circumstances prohibiting
the taxpayer to live on or near the premises91 have been sanctioned as a
deductible travel expense.92
The Internal Revenue Service’s and the Supreme Court’s seemingly
concrete stance on the tax treatment of commuting expenses appears at odds
with my argument that not only should certain commuting expenses be treated
favorably, but that they should be treated more favorably than deductions by
being treated as an exclusion. Such juxtaposition may be reconciled when
considering the evolution of the tax on commuting expenses following the

87. Flowers, 326 U.S. at 474. The regulations to the Code explain “[i]f the trip is
undertaken for other than business purposes, the travel fares and expenses incident to travel are
personal expenses and the meals and lodging are living expenses.” 26 C.F.R. § 1.162-2 (2010).
88. See Coombs v. Comm’r, 608 F.2d 1269, 1278–79 (9th Cir. 1979); Sanders v. Comm’r,
439 F.2d 296, 299 (9th Cir. 1971); Tauferner, 407 F.2d at 246–47; Donnelly v. Comm’r, 262 F.2d
411, 412 (2d. Cir. 1959); Bruton v. Comm’r, 9 T.C. 882, 886 (1947). However, transportation
expenses incurred in going from home to work will be deductible if: 1) The taxpayer is
commuting between his home and a temporary work location outside the metropolitan area where
the taxpayer lives and normally works; 2) The taxpayer has one or more regular locations away
from the taxpayer’s home, the taxpayer may deduct the expenses of commuting between their
home and a temporary work location in the same trade or business; or 3) The taxpayer’s home is
his principal place of business. Rev. Rul. 99-7, 1999-5 C.B. 361.
89. See Bruton, 9 T.C. at 886.
90. See Donnelly, 262 F.2d at 412.
91. Coombs, 608 F.2d at 1276–77; Sanders, 439 F.2d at 297; Tauferner, 407 F.2d at 246–47.
92. See Coombs, 608 F.2d at 1278–79; Sanders, 439 F.2d at 299; Tauferner, 407 F.2d at
246–47; Donnelly, 262 F.2d at 412; Bruton, 9 T.C. at 886. See also Brown v. Comm’r, 47
T.C.M. (P-H) 3032, 3033 (1983) (holding that racial discrimination forcing a taxpayer to live
farther away from his place of employment did not justify the taxpayer being treated differently
than “any other taxpayers similarly situated with respect to deductibility of commuting
expenses”); Kratzke, supra note 83, at 47 (“Employees may incur commuting expenses for
personal reasons, but they are nevertheless an expense of establishing or maintaining a particular
employment relationship.”).
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Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, which categorically changed the tax treatment
of some transportation expenses under the Tax Code.93
B.

Carving Out the First Exception for Employee Commuting Expenses

Not too unlike the purpose of the Bailout Bill, the purpose of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 1984 (the 1984 Act) was to provide tax reform and reduce
the federal deficit.94 One substantial provision of the 1984 Act constituted the
first action by Congress that established a means by which employers could
relieve employees of some of their commuting expenses.95 The 1984 Act
made some employer reimbursements for commuting expenses nontaxable.96
In addition to establishing the general rule that fringe benefits constitute
taxable income, this comprehensive legislation laid out four categories of
benefits employers could provide to employees that would constitute
nontaxable income.97 These categories were excluded for the purpose of
administrative convenience to employers.98 Any fringe benefit not explicitly
listed as an exception within the 1984 Act is deemed taxable and, thus, must be
included in an employee’s gross income.99 The amount included in an
employee’s gross income for non-excludable fringe benefits is equal to the fair
market value of the fringe benefit.100

93. See infra Part II.B.
94. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 1, 98 Stat. 494, 494 (codified in
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.); see supra notes 1–2 and accompanying text for description of the
purpose of the Bailout Bill.
95. See Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 531, 98 Stat. at 877 (codified at I.R.C. § 132(h)(4));
Shaller, supra note 82, at 600. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 is divided into two sections:
the Tax Reform Act of 1984 and the Spending Reduction Act of 1984. Deficit Reduction Act of
1984 §1(b), 98 Stat. at 494. Accordingly, some scholars have referred to legislation mentioned
within this section as the Tax Reform Act of 1984. See, e.g., Gazur, supra note 53, at 978.
96. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 531, 98 Stat. at 878 (codified at I.R.C. § 132(h)(4)).
97. Id. § 531(a), 98 Stat. at 878 (amending I.R.C. § 132); Id. § 531(c), 98 Stat. at 884
(amending I.R.C. § 61(a)(1)).
98. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 707 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 98-432, pt. 2, at 1591–92
(1984)) (explaining the close relationship these benefits have with the employer’s business and
the potential undue burden upon employers that would result from requiring valuation and
reporting of these benefits).
99. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 531(c), 98 Stat. at 884 (amending I.R.C. § 61(a)(1));
Shaller, supra note 82, at 600–01. But see Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 708 n.97 (“Parking
provided at or near an employer’s business premises was excludable, regardless of its cost, as a
working condition fringe benefit. An employee’s commuting cost whether by transit pass,
vouchers, or cash reimbursement by the employer up to twenty-one dollars per month was
excluded as a de minimis fringe benefit.”) (emphasis in original).
100. 26 C.F.R. § 1.61-21(b) (2009) (“[T]he fair market value of a fringe benefit is the amount
that an individual would have to pay for the particular fringe benefit in an arm’s-length
transaction.”).
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Under the 1984 Act, the four categories of benefits considered nontaxable
were: 1) no-additional cost services;101 2) qualified employee discounts;102 3)
working condition fringe;103 and 4) de minimis fringe.104 The 1984 Act
categorized transit passes and parking benefits differently than their current
Employee parking was
treatment as transportation fringe benefits.105
considered a “working condition fringe.”106 The value of employee parking
was excludable from the employee’s gross income as a working condition
fringe benefit, so long as the parking facility was located on or near the
business premises.107 In contrast, an employee’s commuting costs, which were
reimbursed by an employer in the form of transit passes, vouchers, or cash
reimbursements, were considered de minimis fringe benefits.108 While
employees were permitted to exclude the total amount of parking benefits,
regardless of their cost, employees were limited to excluding only $21/month
in transit passes, vouchers, or cash reimbursements.109 With this initial
categorical distinction created by the 1984 Act, the inequitable tax treatment of
transportation benefits began.
C. Creating the Category of Qualified Transportation Fringe Benefits
In 1992, Congress passed the Energy Policy Act (the 1992 Act).110 The
purpose of the 1992 Act was to enact laws that would improve energy
efficiency.111 As part of the 1992 Act, Congress added qualified transportation
fringe benefits to the category of nontaxable employer-provided benefits
excludable from an employee’s gross income.112 This addition changed the
former categorizations of employee parking as a working condition fringe
benefit and transit benefits as de minimis fringe benefits.113
Instead, the new category of qualified transportation fringe benefits
included transportation provided by the employer by means of a commuter

101. Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 531(a)(1), 98 Stat. at 878 (codified at I.R.C. §
132(a)(1)).
102. Id. (codified at I.R.C. § 132(a)(2)).
103. Id. (codified at I.R.C. § 132(a)(3)).
104. Id. (codified at I.R.C. § 132(a)(4)).
105. Compare I.R.C. § 132(f) (2006), with Deficit Reduction Act of 1984 § 531(a), 98 Stat. at
880 (codified at I.R.C. § 132(h)(4)).
106. Deficit Reduction Act § 531(a), 98 Stat. at 880 (codified at I.R.C. § 132(h)(4)).
107. Id.; ERNST & WHINNEY, THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1984: AN ANALYSIS OF
SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS 16 (1984).
108. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 708 n.97.
109. Id.
110. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2276 (1992).
111. Id.
112. See id. § 1911(b), 106 Stat. at 3012–13 (codified at I.R.C. § 132(a), (f)).
113. See id.
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highway vehicle, a transit pass, or qualified parking.114 By creating a new
category of benefits that grouped these similar types of transportation benefits
together, Congress was able to cap the excludable parking benefit while
increasing the tax incentive to use mass transit or commuter highway
vehicles.115
Employees were permitted to combine and exclude commuter highway
vehicle and transit pass benefits.116 However, employees had to choose
between excluding the combination of commuter highway vehicle and transit
pass benefits or parking benefits.117 Employees could exclude up to
$60/month in commuter highway vehicle and transit pass benefits or
$155/month in parking benefits.118 Although Congress took a great step
towards equalizing the treatment of similar types of benefits by reducing the
disparity in the maximum amount of excludable reimbursements from
employers from $20/month for transit passes and unlimited parking benefits,
Congress still perpetuated the disparity between the value of parking benefits
and other forms of transportation benefits.119
D. Creating Severe Inequities between Qualified Transportation Fringe
Benefits
The Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 (the 1997 Act) included one of the most
controversial amendments to the employee fringe benefit provision.120 This
amendment made parking benefits in lieu of cash compensation nontaxable as
a qualified employee fringe benefit.121 In other words, an employer could offer
employees a choice between a cash payment and a qualified parking benefit.122
Prior to the 1997 Act, if an employer offered an employee a choice
between $150 and free parking, the parking—in lieu of compensation—would

114. Id. § 1911(b), 106 Stat. at 3012–13; Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 708 n.96; Kratzke,
supra note 83, at 46 (citing I.R.C. §§ 132(a)(5), 132(f)(1)(A)–(B)). A transit pass includes any
pass, token, farecard, voucher, or similar item entitling a person to transportation if such
transportation is on mass transit facilities. I.R.C. § 132(f)(5)(A)(i).
115. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 708.
116. See Energy Policy Act of 1992 § 1911(a), 106 Stat. at 3012.
117. Id. § 1911(b), 106 Stat. at 3012–13.
118. Id.
119. Compare id. § 1911(b), 106 Stat. at 3012–13, with I.R.C. § 132(f) (raising the excludable
amounts to $100 per month in commuter highway vehicle and transit pass benefits or $175 per
month in parking benefits).
120. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 1072, 111 Stat. 788, 948 (codified at
I.R.C. § 132(f)(4)). See also infra text accompanying notes 131–32 (discussing criticisms of this
amendment).
121. Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 1072, 111 Stat. at 948.
122. Id.
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constitute taxable income, as opposed to a nontaxable fringe benefit.123 If the
employee elected to receive the free parking, the employee would have to
include the fair market value of such parking in the calculation of his gross
income.124 In contrast, after the 1997 Act, the opposite was true.125 The
Internal Revenue Service explained in a Private Letter Ruling that, where the
employer offered employees $150 or free parking, the parking constituted a
nontaxable fringe benefit.126 Thus, if an employee elected to receive the free
parking in lieu of the $150, the employee would not have to include the fair
market value of such parking in the calculation of his gross income.127
For example, prior to the 1997 Act, if Phil’s employer offered him free
parking or an extra $150 each paycheck, and Phil chose the free parking, he
would have to include the fair market value of the parking as income received.
But after the 1997 Act, if Phil’s employer offered him free parking or an extra
$150 each paycheck, and Phil chose the free parking, he would not have to
include the fair market value of the parking as income received. Or, because
of the 1992 Act, if Phil paid $150 for parking each month, and then his
employer paid him back, Phil would not have to include those reimbursements
in the calculation of his gross income.128
Congress believed this amendment would convince employees to use their
cars less because they would prefer cash over the alternative of the parking
fringe benefit.129 In addition, the Joint Committee on Taxation’s General
Explanation of Tax Legislation believed that the predicted preference by
employees of cash over the parking benefit would result in environmental
benefits due to the reduced automobile transportation.130 Thus, Congress
attempted to create a disincentive to drive to work by creating an incentive to
receive a nontaxable lump sum payment. Contrary to the purpose of the 1997
Act, however, employees overwhelmingly chose the parking benefit over the

123. See Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1911, 106 Stat. 2276, 3012
(1992).
124. See id. “[T]he fair market value of a fringe benefit is the amount that an individual
would have to pay for the particular fringe benefit in an arm’s-length transaction.” Treas. Reg. §
1.61-21(b) (1992).
125. See Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 1072, 111 Stat. at 948.
126. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200347003 (Nov. 21, 2003); see Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 §
1072, 111 Stat. at 948. A Private Letter Ruling is a “written statement issued to a taxpayer by the
IRS National Office that interprets and applies the tax laws to a specific set of facts.” GRAETZ &
SCHENK, supra note 18, at 73.
127. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200347003; see also Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 § 1072, 111 Stat.
at 948.
128. See supra text accompanying note 118.
129. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 721 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 198 (1997)); Kratzke,
supra note 83, at 47.
130. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 721–22 (citing S. REP. NO. 105-33, at 198 (1997)).
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cash payment, and thus, the congestion problem was only exacerbated.131 This
provision surprisingly was never removed from the Code and remains
controversial.132
E.

Mitigating the Current Disparity through the Green Routes to Work Act

Although the Bailout Bill added bicycle transportation to qualified
transportation fringe benefits, it did so inequitably.133 Under the current
provision, employees are not permitted to exclude reimbursements for bicycle
commuting expenses in addition to reimbursements for other alternative modes
of transportation.134 Further, employees may exclude up to $2,100/year
($175/month) in parking benefits135 or $1,200/year ($100/month) in commuter
highway vehicle and transit pass benefits,136 whereas employees are only
permitted to exclude $240/year ($20/month) in bicycle reimbursements.137
Thus, employees who elect to receive the parking benefit may receive an
additional $900 of tax-free benefit per year over those who use transit or
$1,860 over those who receive bicycle reimbursements. As stated earlier,
under the 1992 Act, Congress allowed taxpayers to exclude both mass transit
and carpooling benefits for the purpose of improving energy efficiency,138 so
why would Congress exclude bicycle reimbursements from similar favorable
treatment?
As seen in this section, over the last several decades Congress has sought
to alter transportation choices of employees through incentives within the Tax
Code. Both the 1992 Act and the 1997 Act were intended to reduce energy
consumption and vehicle transportation, yet neither actually implemented

131. Id. at 722; Kratzke, supra note 83, at 47.
132. See, e.g., Kratzke, supra note 83, at 47. See also I.R.C. § 132(f)(4) (Supp. II 2009).
133. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, § 211, 122 Stat.
3765, 3840 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
134. I.R.C. § 132(f)(2) (Supp. II 2009).
135. Id. § 132(f)(2)(B) (“The amount of the fringe benefits which are provided by an
employer to any employee and which may be excluded from gross income under subsection
(a)(5) shall not exceed . . . $175 per month in the case of qualified parking.”).
136. Id. § 132(f)(2)(A).
The amount of the fringe benefits which are provided by an employer to any employee
and which may be excluded from gross income under subsection (a)(5) shall not
exceed . . . $100 per month in the case of the aggregate of benefits described in
subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1). Subparagraphs (A) and (B) of paragraph (1)
describe transportation in a commuter highway vehicle and transit passes, respectively.
Id. § 132(f)(1)(A)–(B).
137. Id. § 132(f)(5)(F)(ii) (“The term ‘applicable annual limitation’ means, with respect to
any employee for any calendar year, the product of $20 multiplied by the number of qualified
bicycle commuting months during such year.”).
138. Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, § 1911(b), 106 Stat. 2276, 3012–13
(1992).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

2010]

PEDALING TOWARD A MORE EQUITABLE TAX-RIDE FOR CYCLISTS

441

equal benefits for alternative modes of transportation. And although the
Bailout Bill successfully added bicycle transportation to the list of eligible
qualified transportation benefits, the actual benefit to employees is trivial at
best.
The proposed Green Routes to Work Act would reduce some of the
taxpayer bias toward parking benefits by increasing tax incentives to use
alternative means of transportation.139 This Act would equalize the maximum
amount excludable for the permitted combinations of alternative transportation
methods and parking benefits to $230.140 Under the proposed Green Routes to
Work Act, employees would be allowed to exclude reimbursements for both
transit passes and bicycle expenses in the same month.141 Unfortunately,
however, the proposed Green Routes to Work Act would not permit employees
to exclude reimbursements for both carpooling and bicycle expenses, nor
would it permit employees to exclude reimbursements for mass transit and
carpooling and bicycle expenses. I argue, however, that the proposed Green
Routes to Work Act does not completely eliminate the inequity between the
current treatment of other qualified transportation fringe benefits and bicycle
transportation reimbursements. I believe bicycle transportation benefits should
be given the same treatment as mass transit and carpooling benefits under the
Tax Code.
III. TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS
As explained earlier, tax deductions, exclusions, and credits are “tax
expenditures.”142 It is important to consider the exclusion for bicycle
commuting reimbursements in the context of a tax expenditure analysis
because, as a doctrine, the tax expenditure analysis has been very influential in
the legislative process.143 In fact, the tax “expenditure concept has been
enshrined in federal law and [has] become part of the daily discourse of the
national budget process.”144

139. Green Routes to Work Act, H.R. Res. 3271, 111th Cong. (2009).
140. Id. § 2(a). Wendy Gerzog Shaller proposes that Congress should eliminate the parking
exclusion all together. Shaller, supra note 82, at 615. Or, at the very least, Shaller proposes
subjecting the benefit to nondiscrimination requirements. Id. Employers choosing to offer such a
program would be required to provide the benefit to all employees, not just those who are highly
compensated. Id.
141. Green Routes to Work Act, §§ 2(a), 9.
142. See supra Part I.A.
143. Edward A. Zelinsky, James Madison and Public Choice at Gucci Gulch: A Procedural
Defense of Tax Expenditures and Tax Institutions, 102 YALE L.J. 1165 (1993), reprinted in
FEDERAL INCOME TAX ANTHOLOGY, at 67, 67 (Paul L. Caron et al. eds., 1997) (“Few academic
doctrines can claim the intellectual and political success of tax expenditure analysis.”).
144. Id. at 68.
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Historically, the Congressional Joint Committee on Taxation (Joint
Committee) has been heavily influenced by former Assistant Secretary for Tax
Policy Stanley Surrey’s scholarship on tax expenditures.145 Surrey first used
the phrase “tax expenditures” in a 1967 speech and described them as “those
special provisions of the federal income tax system which represent
government expenditures made through that system to achieve various social
and economic objectives.”146 These expenditures provide financial assistance
by giving a tax reduction rather than direct aid.147 Consequently, tax
reductions make certain behavior more attractive, which in turn, motivates
taxpayers to engage in the desired behavior.148
The Joint Committee has explained that examining these financial
incentives through a tax expenditure analysis may shed light on how certain
government funds are spent and what policy implications may subsequently
arise.149 While it would be nearly impossible to predict all the ways expanding
the current exclusion for bicycle transportation reimbursements would affect
taxpayer behavior, nevertheless, it is worthwhile to consider their expansion
simultaneously with some of the general arguments for and against tax
expenditures. By addressing common tax expenditure analysis themes, while
incorporating the historical treatment of similar benefit categories and the
current inequitable tax treatment for bicycle transportation reimbursements, I
argue that expansion of these tax incentives is socially and economically
desirable.

145. See 2008–2012 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 3–4.
146. SURREY, supra note 48, at vii; Surrey, supra note 24, at 706.
The federal income tax system consists really of two parts: one part comprises the
structural provisions necessary to implement the income tax on individual and corporate
net income; the second part comprises a system of tax expenditures under which
Governmental financial assistance programs are carried out through special tax provisions
rather than through direct Government expenditures. This second system is grafted on the
structure of the income tax proper; it has no basic relation to that structure and is not
necessary to its operation. Instead, the system of tax expenditures provides a vast subsidy
apparatus that uses the mechanics of the income tax as a method of paying the subsidies.
SURREY, supra note 48, at 6.
147. SURREY, supra note 48, at vii.
148. Surrey, supra note 24, at 711, 713. See also Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 711 (“Tax
preferences induce taxpayers to engage in an activity by making it less costly, just as penalties are
designed to discourage activities by making them more costly.”).
149. 2008–2012 ESTIMATES, supra note 30, at 1 (The “[t]ax expenditure analysis can help
both policymakers and the public to understand the actual size of government, the uses to which
government resources are put, and the tax and economic policy consequences that follow from the
implicit or explicit choices made in fashioning legislation.”).
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General Criticism of Tax Expenditures

In general, tax incentives have been justified based on the assumption that
taxpayers would not engage in the desired activity absent a financial
incentive.150 Because of the purported importance of the desired activity, the
government is unwilling to allow the free market to control the success or
failure of certain policy considerations.151 This motivation can be seen in the
Bailout Bill.152 The stated purpose of the Bailout Bill explains that Congress
sought to provide stability, prevent disruption, protect taxpayers, and notably,
“provide incentives for energy production and conservation.”153
Consistent with the purpose of the Bailout Bill, Representative
Blumenauer argues that it makes environmental, public health, and economic
sense for Congress to expand the current incentives to employees for using
alternative methods of transportation, like bicycles.154 Several statistics
support Representative Blumenauer’s argument. Specifically, employees who
commute to work by bicycle save on average $1,825 on automobile-related
expenses, use 145 fewer gallons of gas, and spend 50 fewer hours in traffic
each year than those who drive.155 Numbers like these support the notion that,
by encouraging more employees to ride bicycles to work through tax
incentives, the federal government may be able to reduce taxpayers’
dependence on oil and ease traffic congestion in heavily populated areas.
Despite arguments like Representative Blumenauer’s in favor of tax
expenditures, critics argue that this, and similar government subsidies, are
generally inefficient and inequitable.156 Other commentators have gone so far
as to call tax expenditures “loopholes that need to be closed.”157
One of Stanley Surrey’s main criticisms of tax expenditures is that they are
generally less desirable than direct subsidies, as a means of achieving goals.158
Surrey argues that it is inefficient to provide financial benefits through an
indirect means, such as an exclusion through the Tax Code, instead of direct
financial compensation—cash—for engaging in the desired behavior.

150. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 711.
151. Id.
152. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat.
3765 (codified in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).
153. Id.
154. 155 CONG. REC. E1858 (daily ed. July 21, 2009) (statement of Rep. Blumenauer)
(stating that “[i]f more Americans commute using alternative modes of transportation, we will see
improvements in the economy, workplace productivity, and quality of life”).
155. Id. at E1858–E1859.
156. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 713.
157. Rosanne Altshuler & Robert D. Dietz, Reconsidering Tax Expenditure Estimation:
Challenges and Reforms 1 (Rutgers Univ., Dep’t. of Econ., Working Paper No. 200804, 2008),
available at http://ideas.repec.org/p/rut/rutres/200804.html.
158. Surrey, supra note 24, at 734–35.
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However, I argue there are inherent benefits in approaching environmental
goals, like encouraging bicycle transportation, through a tax expenditure
offered through employers rather than a direct expenditure given straight to
employees.
As explained earlier in this Comment, the concept of tax subsidies
distributed through employers to employees is not foreign.159 “Through the
Internal Revenue Code, Congress implicitly defines, by design or by accident,
what the nature of the employment relationship is, or can be.”160 Recently, this
interaction between the tax code and employment relationships has come into
the spotlight, and concerns have been raised about the economic effects of
these subsidies.161 While some subsidies, like those for parking benefits, are
particularly vulnerable to criticism, I argue employers may be better suited to
address the transportation issue and encourage alternative methods of
transportation, such as bicycles, for three reasons.162
First, employers are in a better position than employees to lobby the
government for improvements within the transportation system with less
organizational cost than individual employees.163 From a purely bureaucratic
standpoint, a single individual is much less likely to be able to achieve broad
policies affecting national transportation issues than an employer, who is more
likely to have the educational, financial, and political resources that are
necessary to influence legislative decisions. In other words, a single taxpayer
lobbying for a tax incentive for them to ride their bicycle to work is hardly as
persuasive as a single employer who can lobby on behalf of dozens, hundreds,
or thousands of employees.
Second, by subsidizing benefits, Congress encourages the creation of more
employment relationships.164 For employees, regardless of what transportation
method employees choose, the expense incurred for that transportation is
considered “an expense of establishing or maintaining” that employment
relationship.165 By providing tax incentives within these employer/employee
relationships, Congress effectively reduces the costs for employees to enter and

159. See supra Part I.B.
160. Kratzke, supra note 83, at 1.
161. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 734.
162. Craig N. Oren, Getting Commuters Out of Their Cars: What Went Wrong?, 17 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 141, 197–98 (1998).
163. Id. at 198.
164. Id.
165. Kratzke, supra note 83, at 47. “However, tax subsidization of more expensive forms of
transportation [like automobile transportation through parking subsidies] from which a taxpayer
derives increased personal (as opposed to trade or business) benefits suggests a substitution of a
more costly benefit for another without actually facilitating creation of an employment
relationship.” Id.
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maintain such relationships.166 For employers, subsidized benefits can help
reduce employee turnover rates.167
Third, Craig Oren suggests that another benefit of the employer/employee
relationship is that the social atmosphere of the work environment may lend
itself to encouraging transportation preferences based on the decisions of those
around you.168 Thus, if many of your coworkers opt to take advantage of the
exclusion for transit pass or bicycle reimbursement, you may be more likely to
engage in similar behavior. Oren explains:
If I saw others successfully carpooling or using transit to get to work, I might
well be influenced to do the same, just as my choice of car is affected by the
preferences of my colleagues and neighbors. The workplace—one of a
declining number of arenas in which people meet—is an apt location for this
169
kind of influence to take place.

But, in order to encourage businesses to participate in social programs, the
“[g]overnment must be willing to meet business half way.”170 The proposed
Green Routes to Work Act provides for significant employer incentives to
promote and accommodate employee bicycle transportation.171
Therefore, because of the unique nature of the employer/employee
relationship, funneling financial incentives for environmental and
transportation goals through employers is an efficient way of accomplishing
those goals.
B.

Specific Criticisms of Tax Expenditures

Aside from the general notion that tax incentives are less desirable than
direct subsidies, Surrey argues there are four main defects with tax incentives:
1) They provide windfalls for taxpayers who would engage in the activity
anyway; 2) They are inequitable because they are worth more to high-income
taxpayers; 3) They distort choices in the marketplace; and 4) They keep tax

166. Oren, supra note 162, at 198.
167. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 691.
168. Oren, supra note 162, at 198.
169. Id.
170. Surrey, supra note 24, at 716 (citing 115 CONG. REC. S5329, S5330 (daily ed. May 16,
1969) (statement of Sen. Percy)). But see id. (countering Sen. Percy’s statement by arguing that
the policy does not support the use of a tax incentive as opposed to a direct expenditure because it
is focused on the need for government assistance in a particular area).
171. Green Routes to Work Act, H.R. Res. 3271, 111th Cong. § 8(a) (2009) (explaining that
employers would be given a tax credit for “expenditures to provide bicycle access” in “an amount
equal to 50 percent of so much of the eligible bicycle access expenditures for the taxable year as
exceed $250 but do not exceed $10,250.”); id. § 10(a) (explaining expenses to remove
“architectural and transportation barriers” to bicycle access may be treated as a deduction from
gross income).
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rates high because of reduced revenue.172 However, Surrey is careful to note
that his disapproval of tax expenditures over direct expenditures is merely a
general analysis, and thus, there may be particular cases in which direct
expenditure programs “do not apply because special considerations are
involved.”173
In order to accurately determine whether a direct expenditure or a tax
incentive is more desirable, a “cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness” analysis
must be conducted.174 This section addresses each of Surrey’s four primary
criticisms of tax expenditures and presents my argument for why the current
favorable treatment of bicycle reimbursements within the Tax Code and the
proposed Green Routes to Work Act fit within Surrey’s narrow exception to
his general disfavor of tax expenditures. I argue that these criticisms of tax
expenditures in general are not applicable to the exclusion for bicycle
commuting reimbursements. Also, the social policy benefits support the
current treatment of bicycle reimbursements as an exclusion rather than a
deduction and even support extending the exclusion further.
1.

Response to the Concern of Creating a Windfall to Taxpayers

Surrey’s first specific criticism of tax expenditures is that they create
windfalls to taxpayers who would engage in certain behaviors absent a tax
incentive.175 Beyond creating windfalls, Surrey argues these expenditures are
also a waste of government funds.176 In response to the concern that the recent
amendments provided by the Bailout Bill and the proposed amendment within
the Green Routes to Work Act create windfalls to taxpayers, I argue that such a
windfall does not exist. Furthermore, these provisions may have the effect of
mitigating the existing windfall created by the current exclusion for parking
benefits created by the 1992 Act and subsidized employer parking under the
1997 Act.177
There is little doubt that commuting to work is a necessary part of
employment for many employees.178 The way that employees choose to
commute, however, is their choice. Under the current tax regime, employees

172. Surrey, supra note 24, at 719–26.
173. Id. at 735.
174. Id. at 714–15.
175. Id. at 719 (arguing tax incentives can be pleasant for people who would have engaged in
the incentivized behavior regardless of whether or not there was an incentive to do so). See also
Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 714.
176. Surrey, supra note 24, at 719. See also Part III.B.4 for a discussion about the criticism
that tax expenditures result in reduced revenue for the federal government.
177. See supra Parts II.C–D.
178. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 723.
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choose to drive to work. Almost 80% of commuters drive to work alone.179
Arguably, driving to work is an activity and/or expense that employees are
likely to engage in without a tax incentive.180 By excluding employer
reimbursements for parking expenses from taxable income and allowing
employers to provide tax-free parking to employees, the 1992 and 1997 Acts
reduced the expenses incurred by employees driving to work.181 Contrary to
the purpose of tax expenditures—encouraging socially desirable behavior that
taxpayers would not engage in absent a financial incentive182—the parking
subsidy creates “significant windfalls” for those taxpayers who would drive to
work and pay for parking without any tax incentive.183
In contrast to driving, less than 5% of trips to work are made using public
transit,184 and less than 10% of all daily trips are made by walking or
bicycling.185 Thus, current incentives for carpooling, mass transit, and bicycle
commuting transportation do not create windfalls for a large percentage of
employees commuting to work because employees generally do not utilize
alternative transportation methods. Moreover, in the context of another
alternative mode of transportation, carpooling, studies show that commuters in
general are more likely to carpool when there are incentives for them to do
so.186
Thus, contrary to Surrey’s general argument, proposed expansion of the
present benefits would not necessarily have a windfall effect. Increasing the
benefits afforded to employees who commute to work by bicycle could directly
reduce traffic congestion, if the incentives or disincentives for driving are
substantial enough. But even if taxpayers were to receive a windfall for
alternative transportation methods, unlike the parking subsidy, such windfalls
would still support positive social activities.187

179. Mann, supra note 16, at 588 (citing U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, MEANS OF
TRANSPORTATION TO WORK FOR WORKERS 16 YEARS AND OVER, 2002 AMERICAN
COMMUNITY SURVEY (2002), available at http://factfinder.census.gov).
180. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 723.
181. See supra notes 118–19, 126–27 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
183. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 723.
184. Mann, supra note 16, at 613 (citing John Pucher & John L. Renne, Socioeconomics of
Urban Travel: Evidence from the 2001 NHTS, TRANSP. Q., Summer 2003, at 49, 49).
185. Id. at 616 (citing Pucher & Renne, supra note 184, at 51).
186. Sharon Sarmiento, Household, Gender, and Travel, in U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., FED.
HIGHWAY ADMIN., OFFICE OF HIGHWAY INFO. MGMT., WOMEN’S TRAVEL ISSUES:
PROCEEDINGS FROM THE SECOND NATIONAL CONFERENCE, FHWA-PL-97-024, at 37, 44 (1996),
available at http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ohim/womens/wtipage.htm.
187. See infra Part III.B.3 (discussing social benefits of bicycle incentives).
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Response to the Concern of Inequity

Surrey’s second specific criticism of tax expenditures is that they are
inequitable.188 Underlying this notion of equity are the principles of fairness,
equality, and distributive justice.189 Tax expenditures have been perceived as
inequitable when they disproportionately benefit higher-income taxpayers.190
These critics believe that tax incentives “rarely provid[e] benefits to taxpayers
who do not have taxable incomes and perversely provid[e] greater benefits to
taxpayers with the most income.”191 However, such concerns are not present
with bicycle commuting reimbursements.
First, unlike some deductions, the bicycle reimbursement provision does
not require taxpayers to have a minimum adjusted gross income to receive its
benefits. As explained earlier in this comment, the bicycle reimbursement
provision is an exclusion as opposed to a deduction.192 Thus, all employees
who wish to take advantage of this provision can because it is predicated on
the presence of gross income, which all employees have because they receive
wages from their employer. Moreover, because there are quantifiable
maximum exclusions, they are less likely to disproportionately benefit a
higher-income cross-section than other limitless tax expenditures.
From a sociological perspective, increasing the present incentives to utilize
bicycle transportation193 could have substantial benefits on certain
demographics because commuting time, costs, patterns, and distances differ
based on age, race, and income level.194 Despite the rationale used to justify
qualifying transportation expenses as inherently personal,195 “[n]ot every
taxpayer would agree that he has a meaningful personal choice of where to
live.”196 Empirical data of transportation patterns support the premise that
some racial groups and low income employees may be more likely to take
advantage of and, thus, benefit from, the exclusion.197
For example, research indicates that women (excluding African-American
women) generally work closer to home and have shorter commuting times then
men.198 In addition, women are more likely to commute (both short and long

188. Surrey, supra note 24, at 720. See also Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 713.
189. Dagan, supra note 17, at 219.
190. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 713.
191. Id.
192. See supra Part I.A.
193. See infra text accompanying notes 212–18 (discussing Pigouvian Taxation).
194. Dagan, supra note 17, at 220–22.
195. See supra text accompanying notes 81–85 (explaining that, historically, commuting
expenses have been treated as inherently personal).
196. Kratzke, supra note 83, at 46.
197. Dagan, supra note 17, at 222–24.
198. Id. at 222 (citing Ibipo Johnston, Location, Race, and Labor Force Participation:
Implications for Women of Color, in U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., supra note 186, at 337, 339); Sara
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trips) to low-income jobs than men.199 If one assumes, in general, that the
closer an employee lives to their work, the more likely they are to commute to
work by bicycle then, theoretically, women may be more likely to commute to
work by bicycle then men.
Moreover, “individuals often trade off money for time and flexibility.”200
This trade off may also create more of a financial incentive for women to
utilize the bicycle transportation provision than men. Sharon Sarmiento has
theorized that women may find less expensive modes of transportation more
attractive because women generally have lower incomes than men.201 In fact,
studies show that women are more likely to use mass transit than men.202
Although women may not typically be more likely than men to ride bicycles to
work, when considered in the context of their shorter commuting distances and
the financial incentive, women may be predisposed to take advantage of tax
benefits afforded for bicycle transportation.203
Research also indicates that African-Americans may be more likely to take
advantage of an expansion of the current alternative transportation method
benefits. In general, minority groups have longer commute times than
Caucasians.204 For African-Americans, their longer commute time may be
explained by the “spatial mismatch hypothesis”:

McLafferty & Valerie Preston, Gender, Race and Commuting Among Service Sector Workers, 43
PROF. GEOGRAPHER 1, 7 (1991)). See also U.S. DEPT. OF COMM., JOURNEY TO WORK: 2000, at
5–6 (2004); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Road from Welfare to Work: Informal Transportation and
the Urban Poor, 38 HARV. J. LEGIS. 173, 188–89 (2001). The reason for the disparity has been
attributed to the fact that women “generally earn lower incomes and work shorter hours, so it does
not pay to commute long distances.” Sarmiento, supra note 186, at 41. However, marital status
also contributes to the length of a woman’s commute time, as married women have shorter
commutes than those who are unmarried. Id.
199. Dagan, supra note 17, at 222 (citing Johnston, supra note 198, at 339; McLafferty &
Preston, supra note 198, at 7).
200. Sarmiento, supra note 186, at 43.
201. Id. See also Dagan, supra note 17, at 222 (citing Johnston, supra note 198, at 345–46)
(“[W]omen are more likely than men to have ‘compromised’ and ‘constrained’ commutes (i.e.,
short and long trips to low-income jobs), while men are more likely than women to have either
convenient (i.e., less than twenty minutes) or compensatory commutes (i.e., long commutes to
high income jobs.)”).
202. Oren, supra note 162, at 162 (citing ALAN E. PISARSKI, URBAN LAND INST.,
COMMUTING IN AMERICA II: THE SECOND NATIONAL REPORT ON COMMUTING PATTERNS AND
TRENDS 50, 60 (1996)).
203. But see Sarmiento, supra note 186, at 43 (explaining a woman’s choice of their mode of
transportation are “varied and location-specific” because of concerns relating to domestic
responsibilities). The choice depends “a lot on the transportation options available in each
location.” Id. Also, commuters in general are more likely to carpool when they commute long
distances and when incentives for doing so are available. Id. at 44.
204. Dagan, supra note 17, at 222 (citing Johnston, supra note 198, at 339; McLafferty &
Preston, supra note 198, at 9).
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African American inner-city residents have poorer spatial access to jobs than
do other workers, because of their concentration in segregated residential areas
distant from and poorly connected to major centers of employment growth.
Lack of access leads to high rates of unemployment and, for persons able to
205
overcome spatial barriers and find work, to long journeys to work.

The longer journey to work is due, at least in part, to the fact that AfricanAmericans depend on slower methods of transportation, like public transit.206
Based on their statistical dependence on alternative modes of
transportation, increasing financial benefits afforded to alternative modes of
transportation through qualified fringe benefits, could reduce the expense and
hardship African-Americans face when commuting to work. Further, these
statistics provide an illustration of why employees should be permitted to
concurrently exclude commuter highway vehicle and transit pass and bicycle
reimbursements. Because African-Americans are more likely to use public
transit, they might also be more likely to take advantage of an expansion of the
current bicycle commuting reimbursement benefit.
Therefore, based on the possible effects expansion of bicycle
reimbursements could have on women and African Americans, and contrary to
concerns under the tax expenditure analysis, adoption of the proposed Green
Routes to Work Act or similar legislation and further expansion of tax benefits
for alternative means of transportation to work may not disproportionately
benefit higher income employees.
3.

Response to Concern of Market Distortion

Surrey’s third specific criticism about tax incentives in general is that they
distort market choices.207 Surrey stated that “even within the area sought to be
benefited by the tax incentive, the design of the incentive may push or pull in
unneutral directions, which may or may not be desirable.”208 Concededly, one
example of the harm of distorting market choices is the 1997 Act,209 which has
been frequently criticized.210 However, even though distortion of the market
place can be viewed as a criticism of tax incentives, in the context of bicycle
reimbursements, it may also be viewed as a benefit because the purpose of tax
incentives is to alter current market conditions.211 In this Section, I will draw

205. Johnston, supra note 198, at 339.
206. Id. at 344.
207. Surrey, supra note 24, at 725.
208. Id.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 130–32 (describing the unexpected consequences of
the 1997 Act).
210. See, e.g., Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 685 (criticizing the 1997 amendments for
distorting market choices and creating unwanted side-effects like urban congestion and air
pollution).
211. Surrey, supra note 24, at 725.
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distinctions between the 1997 Act and tax expenditures to encourage
alternative modes of transportation generally and the Green Routes to Work
Act specifically; and ultimately, I conclude that changing the market is one of
the premier benefits to expanding the current incentives for bicycle
transportation.
In an article critiquing the 1997 Act,212 Maureen Cavanaugh advanced the
proposition that in addition to the tax expenditure analysis, Congress should
also consider the principles of Pigouvian taxation when determining whether
or not a particular tax incentive should be implemented.213 Pigouvian taxation
was advanced by A.C. Pigou and F.P. Ramsey in the twentieth century.214
Under the theory of Pigouvian taxation, tax incentives and disincentives are an
optimal way of either encouraging behavior that benefits society or,
alternatively, discouraging behavior for which the social costs outweigh the
individual benefits.215 Essentially, taxes can effectively address social
problems by placing a monetary valuation on behavior that has positive or
negative social consequences.216 On one hand, the tax code can be an effective
way of mitigating the disparity between the benefit received by the taxpayer
and the costs borne by society caused by a particular behavior, by reallocating
the loss to the taxpayer through tax disincentives.217 On the other hand, the tax
code can be used to lower the cost of behavior to an individual that benefits
society.218
Because of the failed attempt to address urban congestion and
transportation issues through the 1997 Act, now taxpayers receive a subsidy
for commuting.219 Cavanaugh argues this subsidy is inconsistent with the
theory of Pigouvian taxation because urban congestion and transportation costs
are examples of activities in which social costs outweigh private benefits and,
thus, should not be incentivized.220
Commuting contributes to “urban congestion, reduced air quality, and
increased gasoline consumption.”221 On any given day, 200,000,000 vehicles
travel across nearly the 4,000,000 miles of roadways located in the United

212. See supra Part II.D (discussing the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997).
213. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 685–86.
214. Id. at 688.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 689.
217. Id. at 688.
218. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 688.
219. See supra notes 126 and accompanying text (explaining the 1997 Act).
220. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 688. Roberta Mann also argues that “[t]he transportation
fringe benefit of tax-free parking exacerbates urban transportation problems.” Mann, supra note
16, at 637.
221. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 688.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

452

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 55:423

States.222 In addition, commuting to work represents 26% of all household
vehicle trips and 33% of total vehicle miles traveled.223 These high
percentages of vehicle use are also correlated with statistics indicating that
trips to work are more concentrated in time and tend to produce the most
traffic congestion.224
Consequences of this high volume of traffic pose serious health risks to our
citizens that are often unseen.225 It is no wonder that the emissions from these
vehicles in cities account for 95% of carbon monoxide emissions.226 Such
emissions have been shown by the EPA to have shocking effects.227 Each year
50% of the 1700 to 2700 cancer deaths caused by hazardous air pollutants are
caused by emissions from “mobile sources such as highway vehicles.”228
Despite the failures of the 1997 Act, Cavanaugh concedes that optimal
taxation may require a process of trial and error.229 Thus, perhaps Congress’s
error with the 1997 Act should not be viewed as an example to support the
position taken by critics of tax expenditures, but should rather be viewed as an
error which can be corrected. Cavanaugh suggested under Pigouvian taxation,
either reducing or eliminating employer-subsidized parking would reduce
“pollution and congestion while improving air quality, land use, and fuel

222. Oren, supra note 162, at 150–51.
223. Id. at 163 (citing PISARSKI, supra note 202, at 3). On average, “Americans drive their
cars about one hour per day.” Oren, supra note 162, at 151 (citing TRANS. RES. BOARD,
TOWARD A SUSTAINABLE FUTURE: ADDRESSING THE LONG-TERM EFFECTS OF MOTOR VEHICLE
TRANSPORTATION ON CLIMATE AND ECOLOGY 1-1, 2-1 (1997) (on file with the Stanford
Environmental Law Journal)). Further, some studies estimate that Americans lose the equivalent
of an entire work week each year due to urban congestion and transportation. Cavanaugh, supra
note 16, at 717 n.146.
224. Oren, supra note 162, at 163 (citing ANTHONY DOWNS, STRUCK IN TRAFFIC: COPING
WITH PEAK-HOUR TRAFFIC CONGESTION 13–16 (1992)). William Kratzke believes that
“[e]mployee-caused congestion suggests that there may be too much commuting in private
automobiles.” Kratzke, supra note 83, at 47. Kratzke proposes that Congress should tax parking
instead of subsidize it. Id.
225. See Oren, supra note 162, at 151 (discussing the health consequences of carbon
monoxide emissions).
226. Id. at 151 (citing U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY, NATIONAL AIR QUALITY AND
EMISSIONS TREND REPORT 1995, at 10 (1996)).
227. Id. at 152–53 (citing Implementation and Enforcement of Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Commerce, 104th Cong. 209 (1995) (statement of Mary Nichols)).
228. Id. at 152–53 (citing Implementation and Enforcement of Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on
Commerce, supra note 227).
229. Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 717 (citing William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the
Control of Externalities, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 307, 315 (1972)).
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conservation.”230 Alternatively, parking policies and subsidized transit costs
could be used in combination to encourage the use of public transit.231
Another means of correcting the mistakes of the 1997 Act would be to
expand the current exclusions for bicycle transportation reimbursements. In
addition, increasing incentives for bicycle transportation and other alternative
transportation methods may mitigate some of the negative consequences of our
current “[t]ax code that favors driving and suburban life.”232 Both the recent
Bailout Bill amendments and the proposed Green Routes to Work Act are
consistent with the theory of Pigouvian taxation.233 Allowing tax benefits for
those who commute by bike is a way of encouraging behavior with positive
social benefits, which is consistent with the goal of Pigouvian taxation.234
Bicycle riding is both pollution free and a “healthful” mode of
transportation.235 Representative Blumenauer argues through the Green Routes
to Work Act, Congress would be supporting employees “who wish to use
environmentally friendly, active transportation modes that save them money in
the long run, such as public transit, carpooling, biking, walking and
Moreover, by using “fiscal policy to encourage
telecommuting.”236
environmentally constructive activities and to discourage destructive ones, we
can steer the economy in a sustainable direction.”237 Our nation’s dependence
on automobiles has caused environmental and social damage, but this damage
can be corrected by using the federal income tax system.238
Therefore, based on the theory of Pigouvian taxation, the Green Routes to
Work Act should be adopted, the current maximum excludable reimbursement

230. Id. at 720 (citing Donald C. Shoup, Cashing out Free Parking, 36 TRANSP. Q. 351, 354–
58 (1982)).
231. Id. (citing David Merriman, How Many Parking Spaces Does it Take to Create One
Additional Transit Passenger?, 28 REG. SCI. & URB. ECON. 565, 566 (1998)). For example,
subsidized or free parking at public transit stops has been demonstrated to increase transit
ridership. Id. (citing Merriman, supra, at 566).
232. Michael Lewyn, Campaign of Sabotage: Big Government’s War Against Public
Transportation, 26 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 259, 282 (2001).
233. See Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-343, § 211, 122 Stat.
3765, 3840; Green Routes to Work Act, H.R. Res. 3271, 111th Cong. (2009).
234. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 § 211, 122 Stat. at 3840; Cavanaugh,
supra note 16, at 688.
235. Mann, supra note 16, at 616.
236. 155 Cong. Rec. E1858 (daily ed. July 21, 2009) (statement of Rep. Blumenauer). Cf.
Cavanaugh, supra note 16, at 711 (citing Surrey, supra note 24, at 713) (“Any tax preference
serves as an incentive, providing a monetary benefit to make the subsidized activity more
palatable to taxpayers. Tax preferences induce taxpayers to engage in an activity by making it
less costly, just as penalties are designed to discourage activities by making them more costly.”).
237. Mann, supra note 16, at 621 (quoting LESTER R. BROWN, ECO-ECONOMY: BUILDING AN
ECONOMY FOR THE EARTH 234–35 (2001)).
238. Id. at 620–21.
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for bicycles should be increased, and employees should be permitted to
exclude bicycle commuting reimbursements, commuter highway vehicle, and
transit pass benefits concurrently.
4.

Response to Concern of Reduced Revenue

Finally, the reduction in revenue to the federal government forms the basis
for Surrey’s fourth specific criticism of tax expenditures.239 Surrey argues that
tax incentives have the effect of keeping tax rates high because they reduce
revenue for the Federal Government.240 Any exclusions, including those for
transportation fringe benefits, result in less revenue for the government through
the federal income tax. 241 Less revenue results in higher tax rates to account
for the revenue lost because of tax benefits.242
Because most tax expenditures do not place a maximum on how much a
taxpayer can earn through the expenditure, it is difficult to predict how much
the particular incentive will cost the government in lost revenue.243 However,
unlike the tax expenditures criticized by Surrey, all qualified transportation
fringe benefits have strict maximum amounts excludable from an employee’s
gross income.244 By looking at previous filings by demographic, it is feasible
to estimate the potential maximum loss by multiplying the number of taxable
returns by the maximum exclusion.245
In 2006, the exclusion for qualified employee parking cost an estimated
$2.73 billion dollars.246 During the same year, the exclusion of transit passes
cost an estimated $550 million dollars.247 It is necessary to note that the total
lost revenue due to the parking exclusion is offset a little bit by the federal fuel
tax.248 However, the offset is not significant enough to neutralize the other
negative effects driving has on our country.249 Some costs were mentioned in
the previous section, but others include: the revenue spent by the federal

239. Surrey, supra note 24, at 725–26.
240. Id. at 725–26.
241. GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 111–12.
242. Id.
243. Surrey, supra note 24, at 726.
244. I.R.C. § 132(f)(2) (2006).
245. For example, in 2007, 88,723,000 taxable returns were filed. 2008–2012 ESTIMATES,
supra note 30, at 70.
246. Kratzke, supra note 83, at 46 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2006, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES 324–25 (2005)).
In 2005, the exclusion for qualified employee parking cost an estimated $2.59 billion in revenue.
Gazur, supra note 53, at 1006–07.
247. Kratzke, supra note 83, at 46 (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 246, at
324–25. In 2005, the exclusion for employer-provided transit passes cost an estimated $550
million in revenue. Gazur, supra note 53, at 1007.
248. Lewyn, supra note 232, at 282–83.
249. Id.
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government on highway maintenance; the costs of increased air pollution; the
burden on publicly funded medical care due to car accidents; and the costs to
enforce traffic and parking laws.250
The estimated total expenses for qualified transportation fringe benefits
support the proposition that the bicycle commuting exclusion is an inexpensive
means of achieving legitimate social policy goals.251 Although the bicycle
commuting exclusion could cost the Internal Revenue Service an estimated $1
million a year, that amount is tiny in comparison to the expense incurred by the
Internal Revenue Service for reimbursements for qualified parking expenses
and transit passes.252 Therefore, the reduction in revenue should not justify
eliminating or refusing to expand current tax incentives for bicycle
transportation.
Based on the preceding analysis, there are “special considerations” present
in the context of bicycle reimbursements that are not present with other
frequently criticized tax expenditures.253 As stated earlier in this Comment, by
equalizing the maximum excludable benefit for all types of transportation
fringe benefits, Congress could eliminate some of the bias that acts as an
incentive to encourage taxpayers to choose parking benefits over other
alternative means of transportation.254
CONCLUSION
Through the discussion of the historical treatment of similar employee
commuting benefits and the application of a tax expenditure analysis, this
comment sought to highlight the inequities and negative social policies
reflected in our Tax Code. After looking back at the historical treatment of
similar employee commuting benefits, it is clear that as we go forward into the
next decade, we must change the current treatment of transportation fringe
benefits under the Tax Code.
As stated in the introduction, our tax laws reflect our vision of who we are
as a society and how we perceive ourselves.255 Under our current tax laws, the
generous parking subsidies reward fuel consumption and pollution, while
concurrently discouraging commuting by mass transit, carpools, and bicycles.
To more accurately reflect our nation’s commitment to resolving the global

250. Id.
251. As contrasted to the fringe benefits of health and pension benefits which are excluded
from an employee’s gross income and also constitute one of the largest tax expenditures.
GRAETZ & SCHENK, supra note 18, at 104.
252. Gordon, supra note 6, at B1.
253. Surrey, supra note 24, at 735.
254. Moreover, the government could save billions of dollars by eliminating the controversial
parking subsidy altogether.
255. Dagan, supra note 17, at 188.
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energy crisis and to reducing our nation’s dependence on fuel, the Tax Code
needs to be reformed. Specifically, the maximum nontaxable reimbursement
for bicycle commuting expenses should be increased. Further, employees
should be permitted to receive nontaxable benefits for bicycle commuting
expenses and commuter highway vehicle and transit pass benefits
concurrently. Such changes would not only eliminate the bias existing in the
current code in favor of parking benefits which encourage socially undesirable
behavior, but would also act as an incentive for employees to choose
alternative methods of transportation.
JENNIFER L. SHOULBERG

 J.D. Candidate, Saint Louis University School of Law, 2011; M.A., Legal Studies, Webster
University, 2008; B.A., Political Science and Psychology, University of Missouri-Columbia,
2007. I would like to thank my parents, Phil and Diane Shoulberg, for their unwavering support
and, frankly, extraordinary patience. Their constant faith throughout my endeavors has given me
the courage to pursue my dreams. I would also like to thank Professor Kerry Ryan for her
invaluable assistance throughout the writing process. This Comment was inspired by the
residents of Leiden, The Netherlands, who set the quintessential example of individuals who use
bikes and mass transit as their preferred methods of transportation to work each day and my dad,
who rode his bike to work in good weather and drove in bad weather.

